(Jamma) Starting from factual and legal data, the provision in the epigraph presents itself as a simplified synthesis of a theme (the management of tax damage) which does not lend itself to easy and immediate applications. Wishing to access a suggestive exemplification, - declared the lawyer. Michele Franzoso of the Astro Study Center - it can be argued that Article 14 of the anti-IMU decree constitutes an attempt to find a certain income, comparable to that of the coach who claims to recover 3 goals by replacing the starting striker with an "any" player.
In detail:
aside from the general assessments on the merits of the provision, it should be clarified that the decree-law intervenes with a provision of a "procedural" nature, in itself applicable to all subjects who are in the same procedural condition (which are not only the Concessionaires of the awp telematic networks), in addition to all those subjects for whom the possible exclusion from the plea agreement should prove (in the future) unconstitutional due to the unreasonable circumscription of the customary provision to a reduced time segment.
Basically, the expected collection for a given dispute would result in a contraction that cannot be predetermined for many others.
From an "accounting" point of view, then, the lack of clarity regarding the tax deductibility of the payment of the tax damage would run the risk of generating a "loop game", where what the Treasury would receive as a non-tax, in part would risk not to receive it as a tax collection.
From the point of view of the certainty of the outcome of the provision, then, the negligible nature of the "presumed rebate" should derive from which what the provision proposes should derive, i.e. the "rapid reparation of tax damages ascertained with a first instance sentence". In a procedural context in which the right to plea bargaining on appeal at 30% already existed, with the possibility of even attempting an instance at 10% (subject to the discretion of the Board of Second Care), the rate of 25% does not in itself change the decision-making balances of the entities involved in the proceedings.
At a "systematic" level, then, the settlement offer becomes "attractive" where it consolidates in the appellants an expectation of a settlement of the dispute "close" to the minimum and already not to the maximum. The middle ground between 10 and 30 is in fact 20 (and not 25), and only in a percentage of 15 (at most) would profiles of objective convenience be recognized with respect to the waiver of the second degree judgment (already perfectly established and, in abstract , susceptible to annulment of the first instance sentence, as well as further appeal to the Supreme Court).
To these critical issues which, it is reiterated, are connected to the decision to intervene on general provisions of a procedural nature, are added "lateral" considerations which focus on the subjects for whom the provision was designed.
The State Concessionaires involved in the accounting proceedings are the same ones who – today and for the next 9 years – are being asked to maintain a revenue that is hoped to be no less than 2,5 billion euros per year for new slots. We are therefore dealing with "entities" for which the "survival" as efficient and productive entrepreneurial subjects has a central function for the constant safeguarding of the same public budget to which "the standard" would like to provide - now - a "small" patch of 600 million one one-off.
Added to all this is the absolute novelty of the legislative technique adopted in the field of public finance: up to now, in fact, the various amnesties, agreements, shields, pardons, etc., were based on a "substantial" and not a procedural assumption, and on this basis, an "adhesion forecast" was constructed.
In short: only for the provisions that "modify" the situation of the subject by affecting his status (acquired or acquireable) as an infringer has it always been thought of being able to "predict" the counter-value of the revenue from the membership rate.
If a tax amnesty were to be "considered", its collection forecast would not be based on the amounts registered for litigation (or potential litigation), but on other criteria: the volume of "evasion" estimated for a period , it would be considered that on average only x% of it can be translated into effective recovery through taxation and the discussion would be "closed" by decreeing that a special rule can render the escaped person as a non-escapee, and the evader as not dodger.
An "accounting" amnesty should therefore decree that - under certain conditions - a subject can acquire (rectius comprador) the status of non-prosecutable by the accounting jurisdiction for a certain period or for certain facts.
As we all know, then, the end of the amnesty season has a community (and not ethical) matrix, and it is therefore unlikely that we could still see tools of this nature.
In conclusion, it should be noted that a rule of "deflation" of the judgment should be thought of and appreciated for its value of "disposal" of roles and never for its "tax" aspect, otherwise ending in an unconstitutional discriminatory approach between subjects based on their economic condition. A public official of the State can generate tax damages of one billion euros due to his fault in supervising (which would not result in any enrichment); he will never be able to "buy" the definition of the judgment by paying 25% of a billion in fifteen days.
Furthermore, as regards the fact of legislating "ad personam", there are previous legal literatures which tend to consider this approach inappropriate.
While agreeing that the provision under review aims to help the achievement of objectives of priority importance for the State, it is reiterated that its "structure" does not comply with the purpose of a "financial" law, in itself necessitating the use of political interlocution, even before the principles of accounting
